Everyone is buzz, buzz over the reconstitution of Al Qaeda in North Waziristan, from the trad media to the Counter-terrorism Blog to John Robb's Al Qaeda Redux . The fact that this reconstitution is occurring, though, speaks to something other than that failure of the Pakistani government. Here's what I want to know: How is it that there are enough feeder networks of Al Qaeda left with enough interconnecting hubs to organically gel again?
Or ask it like this: How, five years after its last round of physical sanctuaries were bombed, is Al Qaeda a dense enough network to regroup en masse? I think it speaks to a central point about Al Qaeda as a 'global insurgency'-- it's use of virtual sanctuaries on the internet. I think, in fact, that history will show that these virtual sanctuaries are more important than any given physical sanctuary. So, to break that down, let's go to the Hoff (not Hassel).
Al Qaeda Uses Web as 'Virtual Sanctuary,' Experts Say -- 05/12/2006.
Al Qaeda has used the World Wide Web for the past 15 years, but the Internet became especially important to Osama bin Laden's terror network after U.S.-led coalition forces deprived the terrorist group of its "physical sanctuary" in Afghanistan during late 2001, according to Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at the nonprofit RAND Corp.....
"Today, the movement is present on more than 50 different sites," which he said provide a "virtual sanctuary -- an effective, expeditious and anonymous means through which the movement can continue to communicate with its fighters, followers, sympathizers and supporters worldwide."
So, in traditional insurgency theory, scholars from O'Neill to Stephen Metz to Ian Beckett have cited two features that distinguish successful insurgencies. First, they have external support from outside nations or groups (like a diaspora). Second, they have a secure base outside their battlespace (like across the border of a neighboring country).
The question is, can global insurgents do away with physical bases through the use of information infrastructure? Can they also do away with external support? Yes and yes.
Magnus Ranstorp's The Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in an Age of Globalisation starts to make the argument:
Adopting a multi-dimensional cyber approach, combined with creative new communication technologies, allows operational agility and stealth mode far in excess of what was possible previously for terrorist organisations. It facilitates a polymorphic structure or design with multiplicity of nods or pods swarming towards a mission or resurrecting shortly before or after an operation. More fundamentally it allows survivability through a constant virtual presence with no real or tangible physical centres of gravity and in constant stealth mode and ideological motion. Having simply an online presence confers a certain degree of legitimacy which they otherwise would not have. It also allows them to resurrect and reconfigure at any time.
This is Al Qaeda as phoenix, always resurrecting in nearly the same form from any kind of ash. Or, you know, let's not give them that dignity. Let's call it the Virtual Weeble scenario: you knock them down and they just fall into bytes to pop up again in another physical plain.
Ranstorp gives a list of activities which jihadi groups now complete primarily through the Internet "...publish propaganda; proselytise, indoctrinate followers; recruit new members; communicate, train; engage in information gathering and reconnaissance; raise funds and other material resources; transfer funds; plan operations; and engage in information attacks on enemy websites or other critical
information infrastructure."
To me, the centerpiece of his argument is something he never comes right out as says. If you take the Netwar analysis as true (that the five core tenets of success are integration on the organisational, doctrinal, technological, social, and narrative level) then the need for a physical base is not integral. Although a physical base provides geographic linkage, which increases organizational/social networking, its certainly not necessary.
To me, this means that the hidden base of the insurgency can be parasitic to our own information pathways. The country that sustains the insurgency is the same as its antagonist.
And external support? Well, what's external to a global insurgency? In an analogy to the way the information systems have upended campaign financing over the last several years, there are parasitic networks of financing that can utilize the came virtual bases for funds transfers.
So, I think it's important to treat physical bases like North Waziristan (or Anbar Province) as tactical or forward locations. They are operational areas, and their destruction shouldn't be thought of as decisive.
We treated the Afghan training camps as the soul of the network, and I think that was a mistake. In a war that's not being fought for territory, the core of the enemy will hover across the globe, right next to us, whispering across our transmissions.
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